Further Conversations after watching Kristi Burke's "Heaven's Hidden Catch | The Loss of Free Will"

 Me: Something else Kristi mentions is free will and free choice. I'm not sure I've quite understood her distinction but this is my example. If I'm hungry, and I went to satisfy my hunger, and the only thing I have available to eat is a baked potato, I might technically have the free will to choose not to eat the potato, but given the context I don't really have a free choice. If I'm hungry, and I don't want to be, and all I have available is one item, and I'm not allergic to potatoes or I have no dietary objection to eating them etc, then I don't really have a choice, I'm going to eat that potato. Given enough knowledge about a particular circumstance where a "decision" is concerned, couldn't we always predict the outcome? How then does anyone really have a free choice even if technically they have free will?

AI: You raise an important philosophical point, and Kristi’s distinction between free will and free choice seems to touch on a well-known debate in philosophy about determinism, agency, and the conditions under which we can meaningfully speak of "freedom."

Let’s explore this through your baked potato example and connect it to broader questions of free will, free choice, and predictability.

Free Will vs Free Choice

- Free Will: The capacity to act according to one’s own desires, without being coerced or compelled by external forces.

- Free Choice: The presence of meaningful alternatives from which one can choose, where the individual is not locked into one inevitable outcome.

In your example:

- You have free will because no one is forcing you to eat the potato. You’re acting according to your hunger and personal desire to alleviate it.

- You lack free choice, however, because there are no meaningful alternatives. If eating the potato is the only way to satisfy your hunger, the outcome is effectively predetermined.

This distinction highlights that free will refers to the internal ability to choose, while free choice depends on external circumstances providing genuine options.

The Predictability Problem

Your example also touches on a classic challenge to free will: if we know enough about someone’s desires, circumstances, and decision-making process, can we predict their choices? If so, are those choices truly free?

1. Determinism: In a strictly deterministic universe, every action is the result of prior causes, including our thoughts and desires. If we had complete knowledge of those causes (e.g., hunger, available food, past preferences), we could, in theory, predict someone’s behaviour. Your baked potato decision might seem "free," but it’s determined by the combination of your hunger, the absence of alternatives, and your desire to eat.

2. Compatibilism: Some philosophers, like David Hume, argue that free will and determinism can coexist. From this view:

   - Free will is the ability to act according to your desires and rational deliberation.

   - Predictability doesn’t negate freedom because what matters is whether the action is consistent with your internal motivations, not whether it could have been otherwise.

   - Eating the potato is still a free action because it aligns with your hunger and desire, even if the outcome is predictable.

3. Incompatibilism: Others argue that true freedom requires the ability to choose otherwise. If the baked potato is the only realistic option and you can’t genuinely abstain, then your "choice" isn’t free in any meaningful sense. Even if your will is uncoerced, the lack of alternatives undermines freedom.

Applied to Theology and Free Will

The baked potato-like analogy can also be applied to theological contexts, such as:

1. The Heaven/Hell Scenario: 

   - If rejecting God leads to eternal punishment (or annihilation), then choosing God might seem inevitable, just as eating the potato seems inevitable when you're hungry and it’s the only food available. Technically, you might have the "free will" to reject God, but the lack of meaningful alternatives calls into question whether you truly have a free choice.

2. God's Omniscience and Predictability:

   - If God knows everything, including the full context of our desires and circumstances, can He predict every choice we will make? If so, does that mean we don’t really have free will, or is predictability compatible with freedom, as compatibilists argue?

3. Heaven's Beatific Vision:

   - The idea that in heaven we will be so aligned with God’s will that we won’t sin raises similar concerns. If our nature is changed to the point where sin is no longer appealing or even conceivable, do we have free choice? Or do we merely have a kind of free will within a context where only one option is desirable?

A Pragmatic Take

Kristi’s point seems to challenge not only the coherence of free will and choice but also their relevance in decision-making. Here’s a summary of possible responses:

- True Freedom Requires Context: For a choice to be free in the fullest sense, there must be a meaningful range of alternatives that align with the individual's desires and values. Hunger and the baked potato limit that range, just as theological contexts (heaven, hell, divine justice) might limit it in spiritual terms.

- Predictability Doesn’t Erase Freedom: Even if choices are predictable based on circumstances, it doesn’t necessarily mean they’re unfree. A person’s actions can still be authentically theirs, provided they’re not coerced or manipulated.

- Theological Implications: If meaningful alternatives are required for freedom, God’s justice might be questioned if the ultimate stakes (eternal damnation) create an overwhelmingly one-sided "choice." This highlights the need for theological systems, like the SDA's Great Controversy, to explain why God allows the freedom to choose Him without coercing the outcome.

Conclusion

The distinction between free will and free choice is an important one. Your baked potato analogy captures the idea that circumstances can drastically limit meaningful choice, even if one technically retains free will. Whether predictability undermines freedom depends on one’s philosophical perspective. It’s a rich area for reflection, and Kristi’s critique of theological assumptions adds further depth to these enduring questions. What do you think—is freedom possible without meaningful alternatives? Or is free will sufficient, even when choices are constrained?

Me: Well Sartre would argue I think that pretty much all the "assumptions" we hold we are still responsible for, we could still choose to go hungry, wait longer to see if another food becomes available, eat only a portion of the potato. Any assumption you hold, Sartre would say you are free to challenge it, to change it, that's the point of freedom and responsibility.

The other thought I had was the TV series "The Good Place" ends with humans going through cycles of existence, learning lessons each time. I have a feeling Irenaeus and other early Church Fathers might have held a view something like this.

AI: You're absolutely right about Sartre's position. For him, freedom is radical—so radical that even the "assumptions" or constraints we think are inevitable can be questioned, challenged, or reframed. Let’s unpack this in the context of your baked potato example and your thoughts about The Good Place and Irenaeus.

Sartre and Radical Freedom

For Sartre, the key to freedom lies in transcendence, our ability to step beyond the "facticity" (the given facts of our situation) and choose how we respond to them. In your potato example:

- You’re hungry, and a potato is the only food available. Hunger and the potato represent facticity—the situation you find yourself in.

- Freedom comes from recognising that you are not determined by these facts. You could:

  - Refuse to eat and endure hunger.

  - Eat only part of the potato, as a deliberate act of defiance or self-control.

  - Reframe your hunger as unimportant compared to another goal (e.g., fasting for a purpose).

  - Imagine new possibilities, like trading the potato for something else or scavenging elsewhere.

For Sartre, even if the situation feels inevitable, you always retain the freedom to interpret it differently or act otherwise. This freedom is both exhilarating and daunting because it makes you fully responsible for your choices. If you eat the potato, Sartre would say it’s not because you had to—it’s because you chose to.

This radical freedom underpins Sartre’s concept of bad faith: the tendency to deny our freedom by claiming that external circumstances (or even our own desires) compel us. For example, saying, "I had no choice but to eat the potato" would, in Sartre’s view, be an act of bad faith because it denies your ultimate responsibility for choosing to act.

The Good Place and Cycles of Growth

Your connection to The Good Place is fascinating, and it does resonate with ideas from some early Christian thinkers, particularly Irenaeus and the notion of soul-making.

1. The Good Place's Cycles of Growth:

   - In the series, humans go through multiple cycles of existence, learning from their mistakes and growing in moral and spiritual understanding each time. This reflects the idea that growth and perfection are gradual processes, not one-time events.

   - It rejects the notion of eternal damnation for finite failings, offering instead a vision where moral and spiritual progress is ongoing, and humans are given the freedom and space to evolve.

2. Irenaeus and Soul-Making:

   - Irenaeus (2nd century) held a developmental view of human nature. He believed that humans were created immature and imperfect, with the potential to grow into the "likeness" of God over time (a process sometimes called theosis).

   - This contrasts with Augustine’s later view of the Fall as a catastrophic loss of perfection. For Irenaeus, suffering and struggle are not punishments but opportunities for growth. They are part of the divine plan to shape humans into morally and spiritually mature beings.

3. Parallels Between Irenaeus and The Good Place:

   - Both emphasise the idea of progression toward perfection.

   - Both allow for learning from failure without permanent condemnation.

   - Both imply a God (or divine system) focused on redemption and growth rather than judgment and punishment.

4. Why This Resonates Today:

   - This perspective aligns with modern sensibilities about justice and growth. It feels more compassionate and rational than a rigid binary of heaven and hell.

   - It also echoes Eastern philosophies, like Hinduism and Buddhism, which embrace cycles of reincarnation and gradual enlightenment.

Theological Implications

Freedom and Responsibility

Sartre’s radical freedom, applied to theology, suggests that even in situations where God or external forces seem to limit our choices, we are still ultimately free to choose our response. For example:

- Choosing to love God is meaningful only if it arises from freedom, not coercion.

- A "fixed" nature in heaven might not negate freedom if it’s freely embraced as part of one’s ultimate identity.

Growth Over Judgment

Irenaeus’ soul-making theology aligns well with Kristi Burke's questions about free will and heaven:

- If God’s ultimate goal is growth, then the process of becoming aligned with God’s will (or the beatific vision) doesn’t negate freedom—it fulfils it.

- Heaven could be seen as the culmination of a long process of freely chosen growth, rather than an instantaneous change that erases free will.

Rejecting Eternal Damnation

The idea of multiple cycles of existence, as in *The Good Place*, also challenges the traditional notion of eternal punishment. If humans are free to learn and grow, then why wouldn’t God allow continued opportunities for redemption?

Conclusion

Both Sartre’s existentialism and the developmental theology of Irenaeus (or The Good Place) offer ways to reimagine freedom and responsibility in life and the afterlife:

- Sartre emphasises that we are always free, even in the most constrained circumstances, and that freedom entails full responsibility for our choices.

- Irenaeus and The Good Place suggest that growth and learning are integral to human existence and divine purpose, making room for failure without ultimate condemnation.

These perspectives challenge us to think deeply about what it means to be free and how freedom relates to our moral and spiritual journeys. Do you think Sartre's radical freedom could align with the idea of eternal growth, or are they fundamentally at odds?

Me: The idea of eternal growth seems to be more coherent if we assume freedom and choice from the way we understand humans, I guess we might say such cycles might be compared to "training" an LLM but that isn't how we like to think of humans.

AI: That’s an intriguing point! Comparing the idea of eternal growth or cycles of learning to training a large language model (LLM) offers a fascinating analogy, but as you rightly observe, it also highlights a tension in how we understand human freedom and dignity. Let's break this down and explore why this comparison feels both helpful and incomplete.

Cycles of Growth and LLM Training

Training an LLM involves:

1. Iterative improvement: The model is refined over successive cycles, adjusting weights and parameters based on feedback (like loss functions) to better align with the desired output.

2. External guidance: Human developers define the goals, provide the data, and set the evaluation criteria.

3. Emerging capabilities: Over time, the model "learns" to respond more effectively within the constraints of its architecture and training data.

The concept of eternal growth or soul-making in a theological sense could be likened to this:

- Iterative perfection: Humans, like an LLM, might require multiple "cycles" (lifetimes, stages, or experiences) to refine themselves morally and spiritually.

- External feedback: God, or a divine system, provides the conditions (challenges, guidance, rewards) that shape this growth.

- Emerging virtue: Over time, humans learn to align their will with the divine, developing virtues like love, wisdom, and compassion.

This analogy works well if we think of humans as being "trained" toward some ultimate purpose—perhaps union with God, enlightenment, or the realisation of their fullest potential.

Why Humans Are Not LLMs

While the analogy is helpful, it also points to key differences that make it feel incomplete or even unsettling when applied to human beings:

1. Agency vs. Determinism:

   - An LLM has no agency—it doesn’t "choose" to learn or grow; it passively responds to external inputs and adjustments.

   - Humans, on the other hand, are traditionally seen as agents with the capacity for self-determination. Sartre’s existentialism insists that humans are radically free, even when shaped by external forces, and bear responsibility for their growth in ways an LLM never could.

2. Intrinsic Value:

   - An LLM’s value is instrumental: it’s judged by how well it performs tasks.

   - Humans are typically seen as having intrinsic value, not reducible to their performance, moral growth, or alignment with divine purposes. This is especially true in Christian thought, where humans are seen as made in the image of God and loved unconditionally.

3. Freedom of Choice:

   - LLM training involves optimising responses based on probabilistic patterns; there’s no "choice" involved.

   - Human growth, by contrast, is meaningful precisely because it involves choice. The struggle, failure, and eventual realisation of higher truths are valuable because they are freely chosen, not imposed or "trained" into us.

4. Relational Growth:

   - LLMs do not grow relationally—they do not form bonds, love, or experience mutual transformation.

   - In many theological traditions, human growth is relational, involving deepening connections with others, with creation, and with God. This relational dimension gives human growth a richness and depth that LLM training lacks.

Eternal Growth and the Human Story

The idea of eternal growth might resonate more deeply when framed in a way that respects human freedom, agency, and relationality. For example:

1. Learning as Partnership:

   - Instead of being "trained" like an LLM, humans might be seen as partners with God in their own growth. This idea is found in Irenaeus’s theology, where humans are co-creators of their own maturity, working with God to reach their full potential.

2. The Value of Struggle:

   - Unlike an LLM, whose "struggles" (e.g., overfitting or underfitting) are purely technical problems, human struggle has existential and moral value. Overcoming challenges, wrestling with doubts, and learning from failure are seen as integral to what makes us human.

3. Freedom within a Narrative:

   - Humans are not blank slates to be optimised; they are storytellers and participants in a cosmic drama. Eternal growth could be understood as the unfolding of an infinite story, where freedom and choice are preserved because the ending is not pre-written.

Theological Reflections

Freedom and Growth

If eternal growth is framed as a process of freely chosen transformation rather than imposed optimisation, it feels more compatible with human dignity. This aligns with:

- Sartre’s emphasis on freedom: Growth remains meaningful only if it involves authentic choices, even in the face of constraints.

- Christian notions of love: God does not coerce growth but invites humans into a loving relationship where they freely choose to respond.

Tension Between Training and Transformation

The analogy to LLM training reminds us of the risks of deterministic thinking in theology. If humans are merely "trained" toward perfection, their freedom and individuality might be lost. However, if growth is relational and participatory, it preserves what makes us human.

Final Thoughts

Your instinct is right—thinking of eternal growth as akin to training an LLM feels off because it reduces humans to mechanical systems rather than free, relational beings. However, the analogy does highlight some helpful aspects of the process, such as iterative refinement and external guidance.

The challenge is finding a balance: acknowledging the role of external factors (divine grace, challenges, feedback) in our growth while preserving the uniqueness of human freedom and responsibility. Sartre might argue that humans must always retain the freedom to reject even the conditions of their growth, which keeps the process authentically human.

What do you think? Does eternal growth require constraints, or can it remain open-ended and fully free? And does the LLM analogy help clarify the process, or does it risk dehumanising the concept of human development?